On November 16, 1948, the Central Military Commission decided to set up the General Front Committee of Huaihai Front. This is the general front Committee members together. From left: Su Yu, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Tan Zhenlin.
The Huaihai Campaign, which was called the Battle of Xu Bang by the Kuomintang, was the key battle that decided the fate of modern China. Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat in Huaihai was like Napoleon’s defeat in Waterloo. Since then, it has never recovered, and the Chiang family dynasty, which lasted for 22 years, has collapsed. Therefore, Chinese and foreign war history researchers call it "Chiang Kai-shek’s Waterloo".
Sadly, Chiang Kai-shek’s high command didn’t make it clear at that time and afterwards, who was their main direct opponent and who was the key person who caused "Chiang Kai-shek’s Waterloo" in the Huaihai War.
This man is Su Yu.
At that time, Chen Yi, commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army, had been transferred to the Central Plains Military Region and the first deputy commander of the Central Plains Field Army, and Su Yu served as acting commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army. It was he who suggested to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to hold the Huaihai Campaign and develop it into a strategic decisive battle for the southern line in due course. The troops he commanded accounted for 70% of the PLA’s troops participating in the war, and the annihilation of Kuomintang troops accounted for 80% of the PLA’s total enemy annihilation. He made unique contributions in both strategic decision-making and campaign command.
From "Zi Yang Dian" to "Qi Chen Dian", Su Yu successively put forward the strategic concept of developing strategic offensive and holding decisive battle on the southern line and corresponding suggestions
The strategic decision of Huaihai Campaign should start with Su Yu’s two "daring to speak out" in 1948.
After the Battle of Menglianggu in May 1947, Su Yu summed up both positive and negative experiences, explored the development law of the war of liberation, and gradually formed a strategic concept of changing the battle situation in the Central Plains, developing strategic offensive and winning national victory. He believes that it is an objective law that the People’s Liberation Army’s war of annihilation will develop on a larger scale with the strength of the enemy and the changes in strategy and tactics. After the People’s Liberation Army turned to the strategic offensive, it gained a strategic advantage on the basis of its original political advantage, but it was still at a disadvantage in quantity and technology. The Kuomintang army can still rely on its numerical and technical advantages to organize campaign attacks in local areas. Therefore, there is a stalemate in the battlefield of the Central Plains. The key to changing the situation in the Central Plains and developing the strategic offensive is to concentrate more troops to fight a larger-scale annihilation war. In early December, 1947, he was going to report this strategic concept and corresponding suggestions to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), suggesting that measures should be taken in both combat and army building to gain numerical and technical advantages, and that in the battlefield of the Central Plains, the tactics of concentrating forces and dividing them should be adopted, so as to concentrate on big battles. Because his ideas and suggestions are not only related to the overall strategic situation, but also different from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s repeated intention to avoid a big fight, after the telegram was drafted, it was carefully considered for more than 40 days, and it was proved that it was feasible to concentrate troops on a big fight through the practice of the Pinghan Campaign. It was only issued on January 22, 1948, and the wording "Dare to speak frankly" was used. According to the practice of China telegrams, January 22nd is for "child support".Therefore, it is called "Ziyangdian".
Su Yu didn’t know at that time that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had made a strategic decision to divide his troops into the south at the Yangjiagou meeting in December 1947, and decided to draw some troops from the battlefield in the Central Plains to cross the river south and mobilize the main forces of the Kuomintang on the battlefield in the Central Plains to change the situation in the Central Plains and develop a strategic offensive. On January 27th, 1948, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) telegraphed Su Yu, asking him to lead three columns to cross the river and March southward, and carry out a wide-ranging mobile combat mission. The telegram emphatically pointed out: "After you lead three troops across the river, it will inevitably force the enemy to change its deployment and may attract 20 to 30 enemy brigades to defend the south of the Yangtze River." As for the timing, place and method of crossing the river, three schemes are put forward, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages, and Su Yu should "wait until it is ripe".
Su Yu believes that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s strategic intention is obviously to further lead the war to the enemy’s far-reaching rear, reverse the situation in the Central Plains and develop a strategic offensive. The question is, from the overall situation of the war and the reality of the Central Plains, is it beneficial to divide our troops and cross the river to the south, or to concentrate our troops on fighting in the Central Plains? In his view, in order to change the war situation in the Central Plains, and then cooperate with other battlefields to completely defeat Chiang Kai-shek, our troops in the Central Plains and East China will have to compete with the Kuomintang army several times, fight several major annihilation wars, and wipe out the main forces of the Kuomintang army as much as possible in the north of the Yangtze River. Judging from the situation of the enemy and ourselves at that time, it was impossible to fight a large-scale annihilation war, but the conditions for fighting a large-scale annihilation war in Huanghuai area of the Central Plains were ripe. There is no doubt that three columns crossing the river to the south will give the enemy considerable shock, threat and containment, but it is difficult to achieve the predetermined strategic attempt, especially the failure to mobilize the four main forces of the Kuomintang on the battlefield in the Central Plains, and at the same time, it will disperse and weaken our troops on the battlefield in the Central Plains. Weighing the pros and cons, Su Yu believes that concentrating forces to fight a big annihilation war in the Huanghuai area of the Central Plains is more conducive to rapidly changing the situation in the Central Plains, developing strategic offensives, and then winning national victory.
On April 18th, 1948, Su Yu once again "dared to speak frankly" and suggested to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that the three columns of the East China Field Army should not cross the river to advance southward for the time being, but concentrate their forces on fighting several large-scale annihilation wars in the Huanghuai area of the Central Plains. At the same time, it is pointed out that after the first annihilation war, "apart from a camera capturing Jinan, the main force can advance on Xuzhou and join forces with Liu (Bocheng) and Deng (Xiaoping) to seek a second annihilation war."
Su Yu’s proposal has attracted the attention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China leaders such as Mao Zedong. The the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee Conference held from the end of April to the beginning of May, 1948, after listening to Su Yu’s report, decided to adopt his suggestion on the premise that the established strategic policy remained unchanged. The three columns of the East China Field Army did not cross the river to advance southward for the time being, but concentrated their forces on fighting a big annihilation war in the Huanghuai area of the Central Plains.
From June 16th to July 6th, 1948, Su Yu organized and commanded the Battle of Eastern Henan, which not only created an unprecedented record of wiping out more than 90,000 enemies, but more importantly, it quickly changed the battle situation in the Central Plains and promoted the development of the national war situation from strategic attack to strategic decisive battle. Practice has proved that there are indeed a large number of necessary and conditions to annihilate the enemy in the Huanghuai area of the Central Plains, and the decision to concentrate troops on fighting a large-scale annihilation war in the Huanghuai area of the Central Plains is correct. Therefore, on the 7th day after the Battle of Eastern Henan, on July 13th, 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adjusted the original strategic deployment again, and instructed: "The millet corps should fight in the field until the spring or summer of next year, annihilating the Fifth Army and the Eighteenth Army, opening the way to the south, and then marching south (not leaving without annihilating the Fifth Army and the Eighteenth Army)." In September 1948, the the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Conference further made it clear: "In the third year, the People’s Liberation Army will still fight in the north of the Yangtze River, east China and northeast China."
After the Battle of Eastern Henan, Su Yu’s exploration of the laws of the War of Liberation went one step further, forming a strategic concept of decisive battle on the southern front. He believes that the People’s Liberation Army’s war of annihilation continues to develop on a larger scale, and "it is bound to become a strategic decisive battle with the enemy. To carry out such a large-scale decisive battle, we must consider the opportunity, as well as the battlefield conditions and logistics supply conditions. For the battlefield and logistics supply conditions, I think it is much more beneficial to fight in the north of the Yangtze River than in the south. The decisive battle in the north of the Yangtze River is the most favorable in the Xubang area. " He believes that the victory of the campaign in eastern Henan has achieved a turning point from a strategic attack to a strategic decisive battle. The current problem is how to promote the development of the war situation in the direction of strategic decisive battle. Both the brewing battle in Jinan and the future battle in Xuzhou should be considered in conjunction with the strategic decisive battle in the southern line. Therefore, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to make Hua Ye Xu Shiyou and Tan Zhenlin Corps conquer Jinan quickly, so as to ensure that the participating troops in eastern Henan rest, and then cooperate with Hua Ye’s main force to fight a few big battles to "win Xuzhou in winter and spring", Su Yu suggested that Hua Ye’s army rest for a month first, and then "attack Jinan together and Dayuan at the same time". He believes that "as long as Jinan can solve the problem and win the aid, the war situation may move southward rapidly, and the plan to capture Xuzhou this winter seems very likely." On August 23, 1948, it was put forward: "In two months, we can go south along the canal and Jinpu with all our strength, and capture the Huaihe River and Gaobao (Ying) with one regiment, thus creating conditions for the next battle in Xuzhou and the southward crossing of the river."
During the battle of Jinan in September, 1948, more than 170,000 people from three regiments of Kuomintang troops assembled in Xuzhou area lingered in front of the positions of Hua Ye’s aid-blocking and rescue forces, and dared not go north to fight Hua Ye. Su Yu believes that this shows that the enemy is avoiding a large-scale battle with our army under unfavorable conditions, and it also shows that the favorable conditions for our army to carry out a strategic decisive battle against the enemy are gradually maturing. Therefore, when the street fighting in Jinan was still fierce, but the victory was assured, it sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) at 7: 00 on September 24, "It is suggested to carry out the Huaihai Campaign" ("Su Yu Military Anthology", pp. 393-394). After careful consideration, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) replied at 19: 00 on September 25 and agreed with Su Yu’s suggestion: "We think it is very necessary to hold the Huaihai Campaign." (Mao Zedong’s Military Anthology, Vol.5, p.19)
The battle of Jinan commanded by Su Yu took only 8 days and 8 nights to conquer Jinan City, wiped out more than 100,000 people on the defensive (including 20,000 insurgents), and won without fighting on the aid battlefield, which achieved the best result envisioned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and more importantly, opened the prelude to the strategic decisive battle of the Liberation War, prompting the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to further adjust the original strategic deployment. On the eve of the Battle of Jinan, the the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee Conference proposed that in five years or so, 500 million troops would be built and 500 regular brigades wiped out, so as to fundamentally overthrow the reactionary Kuomintang rule. After the Battle of Jinan, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China changed his estimation of the war process, taking into account the practical experience from the Eastern Henan Campaign to the Battle of Jinan, Liaoshen Campaign and the development of the national war situation. Mao Zedong pointed out in the inner-party instructions drafted for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "The victories of our army in September and October, especially in Northeast China and Jinan, have fundamentally changed the situation between the enemy and ourselves." "In early September (before the Battle of Jinan), when Politburo meeting of the Chinese Communist Party built five million troops in five years or so and wiped out 500 regular divisions, it fundamentally overthrew the estimates and tasks of the Kuomintang. Because of the great victory in September and December, it was already backward. The completion of this task will probably take only another year or so. " Therefore, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to launch the Huaihai Campaign and the Pingjin Campaign successively after the Liaoshen Campaign, which accelerated the historical process of the War of Liberation.
Before the Huai Hai Campaign was launched, the Central Plains Field Army successively conquered Zhengzhou and Kaifeng, and four columns led by Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping arrived in Xiaoxian near Xuzhou. Su Yu analyzed the battlefield situation, and thought that the two field armies in East China and the Central Plains would develop from strategically coordinated operations to operationally coordinated operations, and the scale of the Huaihai Campaign was larger than originally envisaged. Only by establishing a unified command system can we unify our guiding ideology, coordinate our operations, and give full play to the overall power of the two field armies. Therefore, in his telegram to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, East China Bureau and Central Plains Bureau on October 31, 1948, he suggested: "The scale of this campaign is very large, so please ask Chen Junchang and Deng Zhengwei to take unified command." The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping replied to each other on November 1st and 2nd. In this way, the unified command of the Huaihai Campaign was successfully solved in less than three days. And Chiang Kai-shek’s high command, from October 22nd, put forward by Bai Chongxi as the director of the Bengbu command post of the Ministry of National Defense, and on November 10th, instructed Du Yuming to Xuzhou as the deputy commander-in-chief of Xuzhou’s "suppression general" and the director of the forward command post. It took nearly 20 days, that is, four days after the launch of the Huaihai Campaign, to barely solve the unified command problem of Xu Mu’s battle.
After the Huai Hai Campaign was launched, Su Yu observed and analyzed the national strategic situation, and thought that the conditions for the strategic decisive battle on the southern line were ripe. At that time, the Liaoshen campaign ended on November 2, and the power balance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party changed fundamentally, and the People’s Liberation Army also gained an advantage in quantity. Su Yu said: "Now that the whole northeast has been liberated, the war of liberation has reached a new turning point. From this perspective, we should consider how to fight the battle and how to give Chiang Kai-shek a decisive blow faster. " On November 8, 1948, in his telegram to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), he analyzed the national strategic situation and estimated that Chiang Kai-shek might adopt two policies: "First, with the troops now in Jiangbei, plus the troops retreated from Huludao, continue to deal with me in Jiangbei in order to gain time and strengthen its defense along the Yangtze River, Jiangnan and South China. Second, immediately abandon Xu, Bengbu, Xinyang, Huaibei and other places, withdraw Jiangbei troops along the river, quickly consolidate the river defense, prevent us from crossing the south, and strive for time to organize their troops in order to rule the river with me and take the opportunity to counterattack. " It is believed that if the liberated areas can still give greater support to the war, it will be more beneficial to force the enemy to adopt the first policy. Therefore, it is suggested: "After the annihilation of the Huang (Baitao) Corps in this campaign, we don’t need to attack the Huai River and Huai River with our main force (the main force of the new sea enemy has been withdrawn to the west), but turn to the Xu (Zhou) solid (town) line to attack, keep the enemy in Xuzhou and its surrounding areas, and then weaken and gradually destroy it (or kill Sun Corps or Huang Wei Corps) respectively. At the same time, the main force entered Huainan, cut off the Pu-Bang Railway, disorganized the enemy’s deployment and isolated the enemies of Xu and Bang.Therefore, at the same time as the first stage of the campaign, the Xu-Ben Railway should be destroyed with one unit to delay the enemy’s withdrawal to the south. "This is the famous" Qi Chen Dian ". On November 9, Su Yu reported to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that "Liu Zhi has a decisive battle with Xuzhou as the center" and is adjusting its deployment. "It is a good opportunity to wipe out the enemy." The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted Su Yu’s suggestion and resolutely made a decision to develop the Huaihai Campaign into a strategic decisive battle for the downtown. Mao Zedong’s telegram reply instruction for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC): "Qi Chen telegraphed. We should try our best to annihilate the enemy’s main force near Xuzhou and not make it flee south. East China, North China and the Central Plains are fully applied to ensure the supply of our army. "
Later practice has proved that this is a strategic policy of actively controlling the war situation, striving for initiative and forcing the enemy to submit.
Before the Huai Hai Campaign was launched, Chiang Kai-shek’s high command had considered "abandoning Xuzhou and defending the Huaihe River" and adopted the operational policy of "defending the Huaihe River and defending the Huaihe River". However, Hua Ye and Nakano were mistaken for "slow action" and "unknown attempt" and "it is still difficult to determine whether Chen (Yi) and Liu (Bocheng) will work together", so they were indecisive and the plan of "defending the river and defending the Huai River" was not put into practice. At that time, the overall situation of Liaoshen Campaign was decided. Chiang Kai-shek was worried that the defeat of Liaoshen and the retreat of Xuzhou would lead to political instability. Therefore, they were forced to adopt the first policy, and assembled their troops along the Xuzhou and Xubang sections of the railway for offensive defense. In order to keep the 44th Army, Chiang Kai-shek kept Huang Baitao Corps waiting in Xin ‘an Town for two days, which resulted in the encirclement of Huang Baitao Corps. In order to save Huang Baitao Corps, Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang and other corps were concentrated in Xuzhou area, and Huang Wei, Li Yannian, Liu Ruming and other corps were ordered to reinforce the north. The measures taken by him, along the first possibility envisaged by Su Yu’s "Qi Chen Dian", step by step towards the road of decisive battle in Xuzhou area. People of insight in the Kuomintang think alike on this point. They said, "it is forced to fight near Xuzhou" and "the defeat without a fight is set."
Regarding the Huaihai Campaign, historians have said "small Huaihai" and "big Huaihai". It is generally believed that the Huaihai Campaign planned before November 8 is a "small Huaihai" and the Huaihai Campaign planned after November 9 is a "big Huaihai". The telegram of October 11th, 1948 drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was titled "Operational Policy on Huaihai Campaign" when it was included in Selected Works of Mao Zedong. In fact, the implementation of Huaihai Campaign was not exactly this operational policy, but "the general policy of isolating Xu Mu from annihilating Liu Zhi’s main force".
The above process shows that Su Yu’s primary contribution to the Huaihai Campaign was to provide strategic ideas and strategic suggestions for the decisive battle in the southern line. From "Ziyangdian" to "Qichendian", in the process of developing from a strategic offensive to a strategic decisive battle, and in the critical period of developing from a "small Huaihai" to a "big Huaihai", Su Yu put forward key suggestions, which played an extremely important role in making correct strategic decisions for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Su Yu pushed the war situation to a new level in due course, and contributed to the successful realization of the strategic intention of the southern line.
Su Yu has a famous saying: "To deal with the enemy, we should not only fight hard, but also fight with wisdom." The characteristics and advantages of his strategic thinking and command art are that he consciously applies materialist dialectics to war guidance, gives full play to people’s subjective initiative on the premise of respecting objective laws, and relies on correct strategic thinking and ingenious command art to defeat the enemy. In the campaign command of the Huaihai Campaign, this feature and advantage were particularly vividly demonstrated.
When talking about the characteristics of the Huaihai Campaign, Su Yu said: "Chairman Mao has an incisive summary of the Huaihai Campaign: a pot of raw rice was eaten by you bite by bite. My understanding is that the conditions for the Huaihai Campaign to develop into a strategic decisive battle on the southern front and win were not mature at the beginning. The development of the situation has changed a lot. The Central Military Commission and the General Front Committee assessed the situation, made unified plans, concentrated collective wisdom, correctly guided the whole process of the campaign, gave full play to the subjective initiative, and took advantage of the enemy’s mistakes and finally achieved great victory. "
The main objective of the first phase of the Huai Hai Campaign was to annihilate Huang Baitao Corps. Huang Baitao Corps, which has five armies, has the largest number of Kuomintang troops on the Huaihai battlefield, and its fighting capacity is above average. Destroying five enemy armies in one battle is a big and hard battle, and it is also the first battle that has a great influence on the whole campaign. In order to win the first battle, Su Yu carefully planned, made decisive decisions, and worked wonders.
In terms of operational deployment, he adopted the strategy of a diversion from the West to the East. Two columns were sent to the southwest of Shandong in advance, and nine columns were used to the east of the canal, mainly to annihilate the Huang Baitao Corps; Six columns and four brigades were used to the west and south of the canal, resulting in the situation that the north and south gathered together Li Mi Corps and attacked Xuzhou, concealing our army’s intentions and confusing the enemy’s deployment. Chiang Kai-shek’s high command and Xuzhou’s "General Suppression" were indeed recruited. At the meeting hosted by Gu Zhutong, the chief of staff, the commanders of various regiments of Xuzhou’s "General Suppression" said that they had found the communists massing face to face. It is judged that Hua Ye troops will go south from southwest Shandong, and will not launch an offensive east of Xuzhou. Therefore, it was decided to abandon Haizhou and Lianyungang, stick to Xuzhou, and gather troops in Xubang section of Jinpu Road for offensive defense. This deployment just provided favorable conditions for the East China Field Army to divide and annihilate Huang Baitao Corps.
On the attack timing, Su Yu decided to launch a battle two days in advance according to the change of the battlefield situation. After Gu Zhutong presided over the Xuzhou meeting, the Hua Ye command organization quickly learned about Chiang Kai-shek’s movements by reconnaissance, and judged that the enemy had "concentrated its forces to stick to Xuzhou, Xu Hai and Xubang sections, so as to prevent us from going south to attack and cover up its strengthening of the river defense and the deployment in the rear of the south of the Yangtze River". On November 6, it was discovered that the 44th Kuomintang Army stationed in Haizhou had the trend of withdrawing from Xin ‘an Town to the west and returning to Huang Baitao’s command. The Communist party member He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, who were hidden in the Feng Zhian Department, "demanded to be more active" in launching the uprising. The development of the situation shows that the launching time of Huaihai Campaign should be sooner rather than later. Su Yu made a decisive decision to advance the launching time of the Huaihai Campaign by two days, that is, from the original night of November 8 to the night of November 6. On November 6 (19: 00-21: 00), while reporting the operational deployment to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi and East China Bureau, he ordered the troops to implement it. On November 7th, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) sent a telegram, saying that he "fully agreed with the attack deployment described in Yuxu’s telegram, and hoped that you would resolutely implement it". Later practice proved that this decision disrupted the enemy’s deployment, seized the initiative in the battlefield and caught the enemy off guard. During these two days, the East China Bureau and the Hua Ye Front Committee successfully organized and guided the uprisings in He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia. Hua Ye’s main force quickly passed through the sector of the uprising troops, cutting off the route for Huang Baitao Corps to withdraw from Xuzhou in the west. At the same time, the division and encirclement of Huang Baitao Corps were completed with swift action. The Kuomintang high command and Xuzhou "suppression general" marveled: "I didn’t expect the communists to act so quickly!"Su Yu later said:" If we let Huang Baitao enter Xuzhou four hours later, the battle will not be easy.
In terms of operational methods, Su Yu adopted the tactics of "attacking the economy and Dayuan", using six columns to panic in the Huang Baitao Corps and seven columns to stop the enemy reinforced by Xuzhou. In the course of combat, according to the actual situation that Huang Baitao Corps has changed from the enemy stationed in the army to the enemy stationed in the army, and from the enemy stationed in the army to the enemy stationed in the army, the mode of combat should be changed in time. From the mobile warfare to the tough battle in the village position, we dug the traffic trench to the front of the enemy position by the method of close-pressing operation, and then suddenly launched an attack, broke through the enemy’s solid defensive position and wiped out the Huang Baitao Corps. While Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi, two regiments reinforced by Xuzhou, heard the sound of guns from Huang Baitao Corps, but they could not cross the line. When talking about the tactics of the Huai Hai Campaign, Su Yu said: "It is an important experience to attach importance to and master the transformation of combat methods and the tactical and technical changes caused by it in campaign command.". This kind of tactics is also unexpected to the enemy. Du Yuming, the commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang army on the Huaihai battlefield, said: "They (referring to chief of staff Gu Zhutong and others) did not expect that more than half of the PLA troops had taken up the role of blocking and aiding, and were prepared to carry out a strategic decisive battle in the Huaihai Campaign to destroy the Kuomintang army. Of course, I didn’t expect this. "
During the first stage of the operation, Su Yu began to create conditions for the next step. On November 7, 1948, one day after the launch of the Huaihai Campaign, he discussed with Chen Shiju, chief of staff of Hua Ye, and Zhang zhen, deputy chief of staff, and thought that it was necessary to isolate Xuzhou and cut off the enemy’s retreat on land no matter how the war situation developed. So he sent three telegrams to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), East China Bureau, Central Plains Bureau, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jianan, and judged that "it is possible to seize Xuzhou ahead of time so that the enemy can’t retreat south" after the Huaihai Campaign was launched. He thought that "the main key at present is whether the Yellow Army (Baitao) Corps can be wiped out and the next step can be made at the same time", demanding that Hua Ye troops led by Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jianan leave the Longhai Line as scheduled, and suggesting that the Chinese army led by Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping should be moved to China. The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) replied on November 8th that "the estimation and deployment are very good". On November 10, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) sent three more telegrams, instructing Nakano to concentrate four columns to capture Suxian County, control the Xuzhou-Bengbu section of the railway, and cut off the route of Xuzhou’s enemy’s southward withdrawal; Hua Ye’s troops were instructed to annihilate Li Mi Corps by brave and swift means, and to cut off the westward evacuation route of Huang Baitao Corps.
In the first stage of the operation, the East China Field Army under the command of Su Yu cooperated with the Central Plains Field Army under the command of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, and always held the initiative of the war, exceeding the tasks entrusted by the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Not only did they all annihilate 120,000 troops from five armies of Huang Baitao Corps, but they also fought for the uprising of more than 23,000 troops from the third appeasement area led by He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia, which dealt a heavy blow to Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi, two regiments that reinforced Huang Baitao Corps. Liberated the vast area from the east of Xuzhou to Haizhou and Lianyungang, and cut off the traffic between Xuzhou and Bengbu, leaving the enemy of Xuzhou in an isolated position, creating extremely favorable conditions for the next battle and laying the foundation for the victory of the strategic decisive battle in the southern line. Mao Zedong pointed out in the telegram drafted for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC): "This is a great victory". The telegram said: "Before the campaign was launched, we had estimated that 18 enemy divisions might be destroyed in the first stage, but we dared not make such an estimate at that time about cutting off the Xu clam and completely isolating the Xu enemy."
After the Huaihai Campaign entered the second stage, the total strength of the Kuomintang army on the Huaihai battlefield was more than 500,000 people in 6 corps and 18 armies. They are concentrated in three places: in Xuzhou area, there are more than 300,000 people in Xuzhou "suppression general" and 8 armies of Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi and Sun Yuanliang; In Mengcheng area, there are 120,000 people in 4 armies of Stevie Hoang Corps. In Bengbu area, there are more than 100,000 people from two corps and six armies in Li Yannian and Liu Ruming.
Three battlefields and a game of chess. How to determine the main target of attack, how to deal with the relationship between the main attack on the battlefield and the clamping and blocking of the battlefield, and how to destroy these three parts of the enemy in a planned and step-by-step manner are the key issues that affect the outcome of the whole campaign.
Since the launch of the Huaihai Campaign, Su Yu has been paying attention to the choice of the second-stage combat targets. In "Qi Chen Dian", he suggested to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that after Hua Ye annihilated the Huang Baitao Corps, the next step was to fight "or the Sun Corps (Yuan Liang) or the Huang Corps". The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) judged that after the annihilation of Huang Baitao Corps, there were two possibilities for the enemy in Xuzhou to withdraw south or not. Pointed out: "If the enemy does not withdraw, we can fight the second battle, annihilate Huang Wei and Sun Yuanliang, and completely isolate the enemy in Xuzhou." During the first phase of the operation, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) once envisaged "the second step is to annihilate Qiu (Qingquan) and Li (Mi) and seize Xuzhou". Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping suggested that if Stevie Hoang Corps leaves Yongcheng or Suxian County, "it is the best policy to wipe out Stevie Hoang". At that time, the battle to encircle the Huang Baitao Corps had just begun, and the movements of the other enemy troops had not yet been ascertained. Therefore, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) instructed: "After the annihilation of the Huang (Baitao) Corps, according to the situation of Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi and Huang Wei, the operational policy can be decided." When the first phase of the operation was nearing the end, the battlefield situation on the north and south lines changed greatly: it was a foregone conclusion to wipe out Huang Baitao Corps, but the situation that Qiu and Li Corps actively assisted the east did not appear, and the three corps, Huang Wei, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming, assembled in Mengcheng and Bengbu, began to reinforce the north. On November 18th, 1948, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) proposed that after Huang Baitao Corps was annihilated in the northern line, Li Yannian Corps was annihilated in the southern line, and Liu Ruming Corps was annihilated or expelled, "Huang Wei could be completely annihilated, just as Huang Baitao was annihilated in Nianzhuang.Get a great victory. " On the same day, Huang Wei Corps entered Mengcheng area and launched an attack on the troops of the Central Plains Field Army. On November 19th, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping proposed that the East China Field Army, after annihilating the Huang Baitao Corps, "will focus on Xu Dong and Xu Nan, monitor the Qiu, Li and Sun San Corps, and strive to rest for ten days and a half. At the same time, five columns or three columns that have not yet been used are used for the downtown, and we will cooperate with Huang Wei and Li Yannian. " Su Yu is equal to the telegram on November 20th, "completely agree with Liu Chen-Deng’s instructions", decided to "draw out four or five columns, add three columns when necessary, and cooperate with Nakano to wipe out Stevie Hoang and Li Yannian", and suggested that "the Stevie Hoang Corps should be completely annihilated first". On November 22nd, the East China Field Army adowa Huang Baitao Corps, Li Yannian Corps and Liu Ruming Corps were slow to advance, and Stevie Hoang Corps violently attacked the Nanpingji position in Nakano, and a favorable fighter plane appeared to annihilate Stevie Hoang Corps. Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping suggested to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) to fight Stevie Hoang first, and asked Hua Ye to "defend Li and Liu with two or three columns, and at least four columns to join in the fight against Stevie Hoang". The Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) replied at 15: 00 on November 24th: "I totally agree to fight Huang Wei first" and instructed Hua Ye to "send necessary troops to fight Huang Wei". At noon on November 24th and at 4: 00 on November 25th, Su Yu repeatedly sent two telegrams, saying that he "fully supported the operational policy of concentrating on annihilating Huang Wei first" and decided to "vigorously cooperate with Nakano to annihilate Huang Wei Corps", and made specific arrangements: three more columns were deployed, together with the 11th columns of Wang Bingzhang and Zhang Linzhi, which had been handed over to Nakano’s command.He has successively invested in the annihilation of Huang Wei; With three columns and two brigades in the Jianghuai Military Region, the two regiments of Li Yannian and Liu Ruming were stopped from invading from west to north; With eight columns to monitor and muzzle Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang 3 corps, so that it can’t south to west reinforcements. In this way, the operational policy of the second stage was determined and put into practice. The East China Field Army under the command of Su Yu shouldered three heavy burdens. Apart from sending five columns to take part in the operations of annihilating Stevie Hoang Corps, it was also charged with the combat task of containing and stopping one "suppression headquarters" and five corps of about 400,000 enemy troops on the north and south lines.
In the process of discussing the operational policy in the second stage, Su Yu judged in the telegram on November 20th that after the Huang Baitao Corps was wiped out, the enemy of Xuzhou and the enemy of Bengbu and Mengcheng had "the great possibility of taking Suxian as the center and trying to get through the Jin-Pu line", and decided to surround Xuzhou with eight columns in a big arc to monitor and contain the enemy of Xuzhou and stop its south aid. With four columns and two brigades, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming were prevented from advancing northward, so as to "fully guarantee the victory of Liu Chen, Deng Jian and Huang Wei". As Su Yu expected, on November 23rd, Huang Baitao Corps was destroyed, and Chiang Kai-shek urged Liu Zhi and Du Yuming to attend a meeting in Nanking. It was decided that "Xuzhou will attack Fuliji with the main force, and the Sixth Corps and the Twelfth Corps will attack Suxian, and the north and the south will advance, breaking the Communist Army in one fell swoop to get through the traffic between Xu and Bengbu." At this time, the East China Field Army under the command of Su Yu was already ready. After three days of fierce fighting on the northern line, the two regiments of Qiu Qingquan and Sun Yuanliang, which went south from Xuzhou, only advanced 10 to 15 kilometers, and they could not cross the line again on the third day. Li Yannian and Liu Ruming Corps on the downtown just arrived in Renqiao area, when they were hit head-on by Hua Ye troops. On November 26th, Hua Ye troops conquered Lingbi east of Renqiao, threatening the flank of Li and Liu Corps. Li Yannian and Liu Ruming saw something bad, and immediately commanded their subordinate troops to retreat to the south of Huihe River. The 12th Corps of Huang Wei, which marched northward from Mengcheng, was surrounded by troops commanded by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping in Shuangduiji area. Chiang Kai-shek’s North-South plan was declared bankrupt as soon as it came out.
In the second stage of the operation, the movement of the enemy in Xuzhou has always been the most concerned issue for Su Yu. He analyzed the situation of the enemy and himself, and thought that there were no soldiers in the rear of the Kuomintang army to adjust, so it was more likely to give up Xuzhou. The enemy of Xuzhou has two possibilities: sticking to and breaking through. It will be more difficult for our army to annihilate the enemy if the enemy sticks to it and relies on strong fortified cities. On the contrary, it is not bad for me for the enemy to break through. It is best to let him leave the tortoise shell and then destroy him. Therefore, we decided not to block the enemy in Xuzhou, but to prepare for the enemy to break through. On November 28, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) called and pointed out: "After Huang Wei solved it, it must be estimated that the enemy in Xuzhou may flee to Huaibei or Wuhan." After receiving a call from the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC), Su Yu further analyzed the situation of the enemy and himself, and thought that the enemy might give up Xuzhou before Huang Wei was destroyed, and judged that there were three directions for Xu’s enemy to escape: first, he fled eastward along Longhai Road and southward through Lianyungang; The second is to go straight to the southeast to go to Huaibei and turn to Beijing and Shanghai through Suzhong; Third, along the west side of Jinpu Road, bypass the mountain area and go south, relieve the siege of Huang Wei and concentrate on defending the Huaihe River. The enemy will encounter a strong blow from our two field armies when they go this way. However, the enemy always overestimates himself and is most likely to take this road. If the enemy’s plot succeeds, the battlefield situation will undergo major changes that are not conducive to us, so it is also the biggest threat to our army. Therefore, in the deployment of troops, he deployed seven columns of the northern line on the east and west sides of Jinpu Road south of Xuzhou, focusing on dealing with the enemy of Xuzhou fleeing southwest. At the same time, guard against its flight to Huaibei and Lianyungang. On November 28th,Chiang Kai-shek really urged Liu Zhi and Du Yuming to go to Nanking for secret talks, and decided to withdraw from Xuzhou on November 30th, taking the third road judged by Su Yu, and passing through Yongcheng to Mengcheng and Fuyang to solve the siege of Stevie Hoang. On the evening of November 30th, just after the enemy of Xuzhou withdrew from Xuzhou, Hua Ye learned from various channels that the enemy had withdrawn from Xuzhou and fled to the southwest. Su Yu immediately made arrangements for chasing and fleeing the enemy. In addition to the seven columns in the northern line, three columns were transferred from the southern line, plus the Bohai column transferred from Shandong, making a total of 11 columns to pursue, intercept and panic in the fleeing enemy. By December 4th, 300,000 troops led by Du Yuming were surrounded in the area of Chenguanzhuang, Yongcheng County, Henan Province, and on December 6th, all the Sun Yuanliang Corps attempting to break through were annihilated.
Su Yu said: "Where the focus of campaign command is, it has a great bearing on whether we can grasp the initiative in the battlefield. I have learned from all the battle commands I have participated in that every battle has a turning point. This turning point is that we have mastered the initiative and won the enemy in the links that have a decisive influence on the campaign, so that our army can surely win the battle. Therefore, the campaign commander should not only have a comprehensive consideration of the whole campaign, foresee the possible development and changes of the situation, but also want to fight the second and third battles when fighting the first battle. Moreover, he should focus his attention on the turning point of the campaign, give full play to his subjective and dynamic role, go all out and take all means to promote the realization of the turning point of the campaign. " He believes that the turning point of the entire Huaihai Campaign was when Du Yuming Group was besieged to death, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming Corps were blocked, and our army was able to concentrate enough troops to wipe out Stevie Hoang Corps. In the second stage of combat, he made every effort to promote the realization of this turning point.
In the first ten days of December, 1948, the battlefield situation in Huaihai changed greatly: Li Yannian and Liu Ruming Corps were stopped by five columns from Hua Ye to the south of Bengbu, Du Yuming Group was besieged by eleven columns from Hua Ye in Chenguanzhuang area, and Huang Wei Corps was isolated and helpless. Hua Ye got the information: Du Yuming suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that several troops should be transferred from Shanxi, Taiwan Province and Gansu to Bengbu to join Li Yannian and Liu Ruming to aid the North; Song Xilian Corps has moved from Wuhan to Pukou; Chiang Kai-shek sent his son Jiang Weiguo to Bengbu to take part in the war. Su Yu analyzed the battlefield situation, and thought that the resistance troops in the southern line were insufficient. If something goes wrong, it will definitely affect the operation of adowa Huang Wei Corps. He estimated that it would take ten days to half a month for Hua Ye to fight against Du Yuming Group, and then he could spare some troops to annihilate the Yellow River battlefield, and first concentrate his forces to annihilate Stevie Hoang Corps. On December 10th, a telegram was sent to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and East China Bureau. "It is suggested that some troops be drawn from this area in order to solve Stevie Hoang’s problem first (Qiu and Li are temporarily on the defensive and partially on the offensive)". With the telephone consent of Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, the front committee of Hua Ye decided that the third column, the south-central column of Shandong Province and a special forces column led by Chen Shiju, the chief of staff of Hua Ye, would go south to participate in the war that evening. In this way, the troops participating in the encirclement and suppression of the Huang Wei Corps reached 12 columns and two other brigades, which were also in an advantageous position in number. By December 15th, the 23-day victory in the second phase of the war ended, and 120,000 people (including the insurgents) were wiped out.It won the second great victory in the Huaihai Campaign.
After the Huai Hai Campaign entered the third stage, Su Yu thought that the situation was completely clear. Du Yuming Group has become a turtle in a jar, and it can’t escape the fate of annihilation. The question is, considering the overall situation of the war, when is the most favorable time to launch a general attack? On December 11th, the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) decided, after annihilating Stevie Hoang Corps, to leave the rest of Du Yuming Group, and "no final annihilation plan will be made within two weeks", so that the two major battles of Huaihai and Peiping and Tianjin can cooperate with each other. Su Yu believes that the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s wise decision has created an excellent opportunity for Huaihai battlefield, which can not only use this time to organize troops to rest, but also take the opportunity to launch a political offensive against the enemy. In organizing the rest of the troops, activities such as meritorious service, evaluating casualties and dissolving prisoners were widely carried out. After a rest, the troops in Hua Ye were enriched, their equipment improved, their tactics improved, their morale rose and they grew stronger. At the beginning of the Huaihai Campaign, the total population of Hua Ye was 361,000, and there were 105,000 casualties during the campaign, which increased to 551,000 at the end of the campaign. The growth part, in addition to supplementing several local regiments, is mainly to supplement "liberation fighters." The political offensive against the enemy was even more brilliant, prompting officers and men of the Kuomintang army to surrender with their weapons. When the East China Field Army launched a general assault, the Du Yuming Group’s 300,000 troops were only less than 200,000, which was completely eliminated in just four days. Su Yu said: "The enemy was finally solved so quickly, which should be attributed to the success of the political offensive. Less than four days and four nights later, more than 100,000 people were wiped out, with an average of 40,000 to 50,000 people wiped out every day. If there is no political offensive,In the end, it will not be so fast to solve the enemy, and the casualties of our army will be even greater, which proves that it is correct to be the best. "
On January 10, 1949, the 66-day Huaihai Campaign ended successfully, annihilating 555,000 people in one "suppression general" headquarters, five corps and 22 armies of the Kuomintang army, and basically eliminating Chiang Kai-shek’s elite troops north of the Yangtze River. Liberated the vast areas of East China and Central Plains, won a decisive victory in the war of liberation, and laid a solid foundation for the People’s Liberation Army to cross the river and advance southward and liberate the whole of China.
Su Yu is famous for being good at commanding large corps. In the Huaihai Campaign, he raised the command art of the large corps to a new level and made a unique contribution to the victory of the Huaihai Campaign.
Su Yu summed up his own experience and said: "As a theater commander, we should constantly study and analyze the comparative changes between the enemy and ourselves, give full play to the subjective and dynamic role, and dare to push the war situation to a new level in due course, instead of waiting for the conditions to be fully mature. From the Battle of Menglianggu to the Battle of Yudong and then to the Battle of Huaihai, I realized this. "
Mao Zedong said: Comrade Su Yu made the first contribution in the Huaihai Campaign.
The Huaihai Campaign created a miracle in the history of ancient and modern Chinese and foreign wars. Compared with the three major battles of China’s war of liberation, Liaoshen Campaign and Pingjin Campaign were all based on winning more with less, but Huaihai Campaign was based on winning more with less. In the Liaoshen Campaign, the People’s Liberation Army defeated 550,000 Kuomintang troops with more than 700,000 troops and wiped out 472,000 enemies. In the Battle of Pingjin, the People’s Liberation Army defeated more than 600,000 Kuomintang troops with 1 million troops and wiped out 521,000 enemies (including adaptation). In the Huaihai Campaign, the PLA defeated 800,000 Kuomintang troops with 600,000 troops and wiped out 555,000 enemies. The number of enemy annihilation in Huaihai Campaign surpassed that in Moscow and Kursk in World War II. Soviet troops annihilated 500,000 German fascist troops in those two battles. Therefore, Stalin heard the news of the victory of the Huaihai Campaign and even said, "It’s a miracle that 600,000 defeated 800,000. It’s a miracle!"
Some people in China and abroad associate the Huaihai Campaign with the Battle of Waterloo, calling it "Chiang Kai-shek’s Waterloo". However, any metaphor is inaccurate. As far as the fate of Napoleon and Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, there are indeed similarities between these two battles. In the Battle of Waterloo, the French army under Napoleon’s command was completely lost, and then he abdicated for the second time, and the "Hundred Days Napoleon Regime" was destroyed. During the Huaihai War, 800,000 main troops, the lifeblood of Chiang Kai-shek’s survival, were destroyed, and then he announced his "retirement" in the political crisis of internal and external difficulties, and the Chiang family dynasty, which lasted for 22 years soon, collapsed. As far as the scale and direction of the war are concerned, the Huaihai Campaign far surpassed the Battle of Waterloo. In the Battle of Waterloo, there were 130,000 allied troops under the command of Wellington and blucher, 72,000 French troops under the command of Napoleon, and 72,000 allied troops wiped out the enemy. The scale of the war and the number of enemy wiped out were less than one-fifth of those in the Huaihai Campaign. In terms of war guidance, whether it is strategic decision-making or battle command, it has greatly surpassed the Battle of Waterloo. Mao Zedong and his commanders in Huaihai battlefield strategized, made a surprise attack, and used troops like gods, which not only created a miracle of winning more with fewer, but also raised the art of operational command of large corps to a new level.
In the process of creating this miracle, Su Yu made unique contributions in both strategic decision-making and campaign command.
Mao Zedong said in a conversation in 1949: "Comrade Su Yu made the first contribution to the Huaihai Campaign." Facts eloquently show that this is a historical conclusion that can stand the test of practice.
Editor: Li Yongchao
